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Abstract. In the current paper, we employ a novel Shadow Play Paradigm in order to 
test Romanian monolingual adults’ sensitivity to truth and informativeness and 
investigate their ability to derive implicatures with epistemic adverbs. We show that 
implicature rates with epistemic adverbs are higher when participants are asked to 
reward characters depending on the truth of their statements rather than on whether 
what they say is the best description of the situation. Given participants’ task-
sensitivity, we recommend that instructions use optimality criteria, as they are a more 
sensitive method of probing into implicature generation.  
Keywords. scalar implicatures; modality; epistemic adverbs; Truth Value Judgment 
Task; Optimality Judgment Task; Romanian; methodology 
1. Introduction. Experimental paradigms that study pragmatic reasoning by either testing the fit 
of sentences to situations or the fit of situations to sentences can be divided into two broad groups: 
They either ask subjects to make judgements about truth and falsity, or they ask them to make 
judgements about some measure of appropriateness. We argue that paradigms employing 
judgements about truth and falsity activate reasoning about semantic meaning, while judgments 
about appropriateness activate reasoning about pragmatic meaning. We consider this hypothesis 
in the context of a case study that investigates the derivation of scalar implicatures with the 
epistemic adverb poate ‘maybe’ in Romanian in the case of Romanian monolingual adults by 
means of a novel Shadow Play Paradigm. We implement two reward versions of this paradigm, 
one that asks subjects to reward characters based on judgements about truth and falsity (Right-
Wrong task) and one that asks them to reward characters based on judgements about the 
appropriateness of sentences (Best Description Task). Our experiments show that implicature rates 
with the epistemic adverb poate ‘maybe’ are significantly higher in the case of the optimality 
judgment task (Best Description Task) than in the Truth Value Judgment Task (Right-Wrong 
Task), thus emphasizing an important methodological point: that results and, consequently, the 
theory accounting for them are largely dependent upon the methods used.  
The paper is organized as follows:  After a brief introduction, in Section 2, we present previous 
research on scalar implicatures from a methodological perspective. Section 3 deals with previous 
research on epistemic modality in language acquisition. Section 4 describes the experiments we 
conducted (Goals, Participants, Methodology, Results). Section 5 discusses the results and their 
consequences for future research on scales. Section 6 draws a conclusion on this basis.  
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2. Previous research on scalar implicatures. A methodological perspective. An important 
methodological decision is how to find out whether participants derive implicatures or not (Noveck 
2001, Papafragou & Musolino 2003, Geurts & Pouscolous 2009, Clifton & Dube 2010, Katsos & 
Bishop 2011, van Tiel 2013, Benz & Gotzner 2014, a.o.). Experiments are essentially classified 
into whether they test the fit of sentences to situations (the most frequent method), the fit of 
situations to sentences, or whether they resort to some indirect measure of the responses given by 
participants (such as rewards in the Best Response Paradigm in Gotzner & Benz 2018). Given that 
the literature on implicatures is extremely vast, and covering it is beyond the scope of this paper, 
our presentation will mainly focus on some relevant examples of the most commonly used 
paradigm, the paradigm which tests the fit of sentences to situations. 
 In order to find out whether subjects derive implicatures when confronted with a statement 
like Some dogs are black/The dogs may be behind the curtain in a context where all dogs are 
black/behind the curtain, experimental paradigms initially employed questions used in the original 
Truth Value Judgment Task (Crain & McKee 1985, Crain & Thornton 1998) such as Is the puppet 
right? or Do you agree with the statement? (Noveck 2001). However, Papafragou & Musolino 
(2003:264) challenged this methodology, arguing that such questions actually tap into speakers’ 
sensitivity to truth:   
 
“In our version, instead of asking subjects if the puppet is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ (as in the 
original TVJT), we asked whether the puppet ‘answered well’ (i.e., Apantise kala, ‘Did-
(she)-answer well?’). This modification was made since we were interested in felicity, not 
truth.” 
 
While running a Truth Value Judgment Task calls for questions about right/wrong or 
true/false, agree/disagree, running a Felicity Judgment Task calls for questions about 
adequacy/appropriateness. This idea has been explored in various ways in the literature dealing 
with scalar implicatures, which consequently experienced a methodological shift from truth-
oriented to felicity-oriented tasks (Katsos & Bishop 2011). In a sense, even asking if a puppet 
answered well may be too weak, given that subjects may assess certain underinformative 
statements as good enough, and, thus, still evaluate matters in terms of truth value. For this reason, 
experimental pragmatics has been trying to employ novel methods which make subjects sensitive 
to the difference between optimal statements (the best, most felicitous statements in a certain 
pragmatic context) and statements that are true but less optimal.  
Among the paradigms testing the fit of sentences to situations, one way of testing optimality 
rather than truth is by asking subjects to provide graded judgments. Katsos & Bishop (2011) tested 
6- to 7-year-old English-speaking children for underinformativeness with existential quantifiers 
by means of a ternary Reward Task where children were asked to offer a ‘small’, ‘big’, or ‘huge’ 
strawberry as a reward to Mr. Caveman depending on how good the speaker’s responses were. The 
paradigm revealed sensitivity to underinformativeness on the part of children, who rewarded such 
statements with big strawberries instead of huge or small ones. Given children’s general 
acceptance of underinformative statements in a standard Truth Value Judgment Task (Katsos & 
Bishop 2011), the results from the ternary task were quite surprising, revealing that children had 
more pragmatic sensitivity than previously thought. This led Katsos & Bishop (2011) to argue that 
the yes-no binary task was not fine-grained enough to capture the difference between truth and 
informativeness, and, thus, it gave the illusion that children were insensitive to violations of 
informativeness, when, in fact, they were merely tolerant. A different manner of implementing 
graded judgments is by asking participants to rate certain sentences as descriptions of certain 
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images by placing the cursor between yes and no. Using the cursor placement method, Chemla & 
Spector (2011) conducted several experiments testing whether adults derive local implicatures in 
sentences like Every letter is connected to some of its circles (‘Every letter is connected to some, 
not all of its circles.’) and concluded that local implicatures are attested, against Geurts & 
Pouscoulous (2009).  
Another way of testing pragmatic adequacy/optimality is the Felicity Judgment Task, which 
also tests the fit of sentences to situations, but through a Forced Choice Task where participants 
choose the best sentence out of two sentences. Foppolo, Guasti & Chierchia (2012) conducted a 
Felicity Judgment Task (Experiment 5 in the paper) on 5-year-old Italian children in order to 
investigate their ability to generate implicatures with existential quantifiers. The set-up involved 
two puppets who were always quarrelling about which of them described various pictures best, 
and children had to be the judge. For instance, Puppet 1 would utter a weak, underinformative 
statement with qualche ‘some’, while Puppet 2 would utter a stronger, informative statement with 
tutti ‘all’. Then, children were asked: “Which puppet said it better?”. A similar methodology was 
used by Ozturk & Papafragou (2015) in order to test children’s ability to derive implicatures with 
epistemic may: children had to choose between the statements produced by Minnie and Donald 
about the location of an animal in one of two boxes (an underinformative statement with may and 
a fully informative statement with have to). Importantly, the tasks reveal adult-like answers on the 
part of children, showing that access to stronger alternatives eases pragmatic understanding.  
There are also paradigms that do not ask for judgments about fit of sentences to situations, or 
situations to sentences, such as the Best Response Paradigm proposed by Gotzner and Benz (2018). 
An important point about the paradigm is that it avoids meta-linguistic judgments about either 
truth or appropriateness. Instead, judgments are read off from the rewards given by participants in 
an interactive game–theoretic reward task set-up which satisfies Grice’s conversational 
requirements for implicature generation (a recognizable purpose for the talk exchange). In a task 
where four girls have lost all/some/none of their marbles and they have to find them again, adults 
have to handle an explicit decision problem, rewarding characters based on statements about how 
many marbles they find: (i) chocolate for finding all of the marbles, (ii) candy for fewer than all 
and (iii) a gummy bear for none of the marbles (as a consolation prize). Such a task led to many 
local implicatures in utterances like All of the girls found some of their marbles (‘All of the girls 
found some, not all of their marbles’), revealing subjects’ sensitivity to subtle considerations of 
informativeness. This paradigm revealed quite different results from binary Truth Value Judgment 
tasks (see also Benz & Gotzner, in press, for an interactive version of the Best Response Paradigm).  
Apart from the notion of felicity, another notion that has been brought under discussion in 
relation to the adequacy of an underinformative utterance to a pragmatic context is typicality, that 
is, the degree to which the situation described by the utterance is a typical one (van Tiel 2013). 
Typicality has been studied experimentally starting with Rosch (1975), who asked participants to 
produce typicality orderings by evaluating hyponyms of BIRD (i.e., robin) along a 7-point Likert-
scale. Typical members are learnt earlier, recognized faster and more accurately, and produced 
earlier (van Tiel 2013). Interestingly, many experiments on implicatures (Geurts & Pouscoulous 
2009, Clifton & Dube 2010, Chemla & Spector 2011) are quite similar to Rosch’s rating task: 
participants see a category with several instances/a sentence with several situations and have to 
decide how well the category/the sentence describes them. For this reason, van Tiel (2013) argues 
that typicality differences may influence the interpretation not only of predicates like bird but also 
of a quantifier like some. For instance, Begg (1987) found that the typical meaning of some is less 
than half, and Degen & Tanenhaus (2011) obtained similar results. In the context of associating 
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pictures representing various situations with statements, typicality may overlap with felicity or 
optimality, given that the best statement describing a situation is probably the most typical one as 
well- though various aspects seem to impact typicality (e.g. plausibility, world knowledge, 
a.o.).We note that for our purposes, in the case of epistemic items, both possibility and certainty 
items are licensed in contexts where one does not have direct access to the objects/animals under 
discussion. However, using possible instead of certain in a context of certainty would count as not 
typical, as well as infelicitous and not optimal, given that possible is expected only in uncertainty 
contexts. The previously noted advantages of methods relying on optimality/felicity lie at the basis 
of the current experiments on implicatures with epistemic adverbs, contrasting truth sensitivity to 
pragmatic sensitivity. 
3. Previous research on epistemic modality. Methodological insights from language 
acquisition. Many experimental studies on epistemic modality (Hirst & Weil 1982, Noveck, Ho 
& Sera 1996, Noveck 2001, Ozturk & Papafragou 2015 a.o.) have focused on the acquisition of 
epistemic modal verbs. Such studies have shown that children are sensitive to the relative strength 
of modal verbs from very early on. Although aware of the existence of a modal scale, children still 
have difficulties with modals at age 5, achieving epistemic maturity only later on, around age 7.  
The paradigm used in the studies on epistemic modality is some version of the Hidden Object 
Task, where, based on evidence, subjects have to infer the location of a certain hidden object. A 
first version of the task is represented by the Look for the Peanut Task (Hirst & Weil 1982), where 
children were asked to look for a peanut on the basis of certain statements with modals they heard. 
Noveck, Ho & Sera (1996) and Noveck (2001) then tested epistemic items by employing the Box 
Paradigm, where objects are hidden in boxes, a paradigm which was later on simplified by Ozturk 
& Papafragou (2015). In the initial box paradigm, there were three boxes (two uncovered boxes 
which contained an animal or two and a covered one), and subjects were interrogated about a third 
covered box based on disjunctive statements of the type “This box has the same content as either 
Box A or as Box B”. Ozturk & Papafragou (2015) reduced the complexity of the paradigm by 
resorting to only two boxes and one single animal and by resorting to non-disjunctive input. The 
semantic Forced Choice Task conducted by Noveck, Ho & Sera (1996) and the semantic Truth 
Value Judgment Task conducted by Ozturk & Papafragou (2015) both showed that young children 
have a tendency to reduce uncertainty and accept situations where a stronger statement (with has 
to) is made instead of a weaker one (with may). In terms of pragmatics, Noveck (2001) conducted 
a Truth Value Judgment Task, where subjects had to say whether they agreed with a certain 
statement, while Ozturk & Papafragou (2015) ran a Felicity Judgment Task, where subjects had to 
choose between two statements (an underinformative statement versus a fully informative 
statement). 5-year-olds performed more adult-like in the Felicity Judgment Task than in the Truth 
Value Judgment Task, which further reinforces the idea that implicatures are more easily accessed 
by tasks focusing on pragmatic adequacy. Interestingly, regardless of the task type, the implicature 
rates with modals were quite high for adults (close to 90%). Nevertheless, in an adaptation of 
Noveck (2001) on epistemic adverbs in Romanian (Bleotu 2019), many adults were too cautious, 
rejecting statements about the certainty of something they could not see.  
4. Current experiments: Truth and optimality in the Shadow Play Paradigm. 
4.1. RATIONALE AND GOALS.  Given subjects’ caution in the Hidden Object Paradigm, i.e., in 
situations of no direct access to the object, we developed a novel Shadow Play Paradigm, where 
subjects have to reward a dragon for the statements he makes about the identity of a 
shadow/silhouette, on the basis of certain evidence. Importantly, unlike in the Hidden Object 
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Paradigm, in the Shadow Play Paradigm, subjects can infer that the shadow must belong to an 
animal by looking at its silhouette and also because of sounds that accompany it (e.g., woof-woof, 
representing a dog). By making indirect evidence more direct and, thus, making the task more 
evidential, we aimed to prevent subjects from being overly cautious and giving unreliable answers.  
The paradigm itself draws inspiration from shadow play theater, an ancient art form with 
silhouettes. A similar but somewhat simpler paradigm was also employed by Heizmann (2006) in 
order to test whether children make indirect inferences with necessity modals in English and 
German. Heizmann (2006) used real characters and their silhouettes in order to see how children 
interpret questions such as Who must be eating a banana? versus Who must eat a banana?. The 
Reward Task was inspired from Katsos & Bishop (2011) but, instead of using a ternary Reward 
system, we used a binary reward system associated with different linguistic input.  
In order to test whether subjects are more sensitive to underinformativeness than to truth value 
in deriving scalar implicatures, we decided to run the same shadow play test in two different 
versions: (1) a Right-Wrong Task, where subjects were asked to reward a baby dragon with a 
big/small apple depending on the truth value of his statement, and (2) a Best Description Task, 
where subjects had to reward a baby dragon with a big/small apple depending on whether what he 
said was the best description of the situation or not. The expectation was that participants would 
derive more implicatures in the Best Description Task, which encourages pragmatic sensitivity.  
4.2. METHODOLOGY.  
 
4.2.1. PARTICIPANTS. The Right-Wrong Task was conducted on 64 native Romanian speakers, and 
the optimality test was conducted on 63 Romanian native speakers, recruited from 1st and 2nd year 
students at the Faculty of Foreign Languages, University of Bucharest.  
4.2.2. MATERIALS. We implemented two versions of our experiment in PennController (Zehr & 
Schwarz 2018). While the experiments employ the same type of task (a Reward Task), the criteria 
for rewarding were different: truth value (“right-wrong”) (in the Right-Wrong Task) and 
optimality (“best description”) (in the Best Description Task). The set-up was exactly the same for 
both experiment versions. The scenario was that of a Shadow Play Paradigm, telling participants 
that there is a wizard who likes to play the shadow game with a baby dragon. In this game, various 
animals go and hide behind the curtain—but some of them may come in front of the curtain later 
on. The baby dragon has to say who he thinks the shadow belongs to. Participants are told that 
they are supposed to reward the baby dragon with a big apple if what he says is right (Right-Wrong 
Task) / the best description (Best Description Task) and with a small apple if what he says is wrong 
(Right-Wrong Task) / not the best description (Best Description Task). Importantly, such a 
contrastive experimental set-up assumes that, in the Right-Wrong Task, subjects will reward both 
fully informative and underinformative true statements with a big apple, whereas, in the Best 
Description Task, they will only reward fully informative statements with a big apple, and 
underinformative true statements will receive a small apple, just like false ones (see Table 1): 
 
RIGHT WRONG 
FULLY INFORMATIVE UNDERINFORMATIVE FALSE 
THE BEST DESCRIPTION NOT THE BEST DESCRIPTION 
 
Table 1: Truth, informativity and optimality 
 
The experimental materials involve several associated pictures and sentences. Each picture has a 
main silhouette, a small image with the animals in front of the curtain, and a small image with all 
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the animals in the game (see Figures 1, 2). The small image on the left (ALL ANIMALS) is always 
present for subjects to easily access the initial situation, without processing difficulties because of 
memory load (Crain & Thornton 1998). There are various groups of animals of various colors: a 
training group of two bunnies and 4 testing groups of three animals each: dog, frogs, cats, cows. 
We presented participants with 59 sentences in total (3 training sentences, 2x4=8 test 
sentences, 2x24=48 control sentences containing poate ‘maybe’ or sigur ‘certainly’ presented in a 
randomized manner, see Table 2). The randomization was applied both within the same group of 
animals and across groups. The test contains a number of sentences balanced between the two 
epistemic adverbs so as to activate the modal scale <possible, certain> and trigger pragmatic 
readings. The key sentences for implicature detection are highlighted in yellow. All the sentences 
(except for the practice ones) have the same structure: the adverb poate ‘maybe’ / sigur ‘certainly’ 
followed by the complementizer cǎ ‘that’ and an embedded sentence.  
 


































Table 2: Types of utterances tested per Scenario 
 
4.2.3. PROCEDURE. The experiment started with a training session, followed by the main 
experiment. In the training session, participants get acquainted with the picture design and practice 
rewarding on the basis of a bunny shadow picture (see Figure 1), where they have to reward the 
baby dragon with big or small apples. Subjects were presented with sentences such as the ones in 
(1). In the first sentence in (1a), subjects were told which reward to choose (the small apple), while, 
in the other sentences, they had to choose the reward themselves. The training items were the same 





Figure 1:  Item from training session 
 
(1) a.  Este un şoarece /o vacǎ. (FALSE) 
   ‘It is a mouse/a cow.’ 
 b.  Este un iepuraş. (TRUE/OPTIMAL) 
    ‘It is a bunny.’ 
 
We will now exemplify the testing session by reference to the group of dogs.  
Scenario 1, the None in front Scenario (where all dogs go behind the curtain, see Figure 2) 
ensures that subjects have in mind the set of animals (the referential domain) that is at issue, rather 
than all the animals in the world, or the animals in the game. Sentences (2a) and (2b) are the critical 
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conditions. Sentence (2c) was a control sentence. Subjects are supposed to reason that the animal 
whose silhouette they see must be a dog, not a cat, not a cow, not a frog, and, hence, choose a 
small apple as reward. Subjects who only consider semantic meaning are expected to reward the 
dragon with a big apple in conditions (2a) and (2b), and subjects that strengthen the weak epistemic 




Figure 2: Example picture for the None/One/Two in front Scenarios 
 
(2) a.  Poate cǎ este un cȃine. (UNDERINFO) 
   ‘It is possible that it is a dog.’ 
 b.  Sigur cǎ este un cȃine (OPTIMAL) 
   ‘It is certain that it is a dog.’ 
 c.   Poate/sigur cǎ este o pisicǎ. (FALSE) 
     ‘It is possible/certain that it is a cat.’ 
 
Scenario 2, the One in front Scenario (where one animal comes back in front of the curtain, in 
this case, the yellow dog, see Figure 2) tests the subjects’ understanding of alternatives, their ability 
to reason that the situation has two possible outcomes: either the silhouette belongs to the red dog, 
or it belongs to the blue dog. Subjects were expected to choose a big apple for the optimal control 
statements in (3a) and a small apple for the wrong statements in (3b, c). 
 
(3) a.   Poate cǎ este cȃinele roşu/albastru. (OPTIMAL) 
               ‘It is possible that it is the red/blue dog.’ 
 b.   Sigur cǎ este cȃinele roşu/albastru. (OVERLY STRONG) 
         ‘It is certain that it is the red/blue dog.’  
 c.    Poate/Sigur cǎ este cȃinele galben. (FALSE) 
          ‘It is possible/certain that it is the yellow dog.’ 
 
Scenario 3, the Two in front Scenario (where two animals are in front of the curtain, see Figure 
2) tests whether subjects are able to reason that the silhouette can only belong to the blue dog, 
given that there are two animals in front of the curtain now. Sentences (4c, d) were control 
sentences. Subjects who only consider semantic meaning are expected to reward the dragon with 
a big apple in both (4a) and (4b), and subjects that strengthen the weak epistemic to ‘not certain’ 
are expected to choose a big apple for (4b) but not for (4a). 
 
(4)   a.     Poate cǎ este cȃinele albastru. (UNDERINFO) 
                ‘It is possible that it is the blue dog.’ 
b.    Sigur cǎ este cȃinele albastru. (OPTIMAL) 
                   ‘It is certain that it is the blue dog.’ 
c.     Poate cǎ este cȃinele roşu. (FALSE) 
         ‘It is possible that it is the red dog.’ 
            d.     Sigur cǎ este cȃinele roşu. (FALSE) 
         ‘It is certain that it is the red dog.’ 
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4.3. RESULTS. All subjects were included in the analysis of the data given that there were no 
subjects who made more than 1 error out of 3 in the bunny control items. In order to see the 
difference in choices between the Right-Wrong Task and the Best Description Task, we performed 
analyses: (a) on the whole set of data, (b) on subsets of the data: (i) underinformative statements, 
(ii) (true optimal and false) control statements, and (iii) overly strong statements. 
4.3.1. WHOLE DATA ANALYSIS. Using R (2018), We computed a logit mixed-effects model with Task 
type and Statement type (control, underinformative, overly strong) as fixed effects with treatment 
coding and Item and Participant as random effects. The model took the answers to the control 
condition as the baseline. The results show that the type of task, the overly strong statement type 
and the underinformative statement type are statistically significant (see Table 3). In addition, the 
interaction between the type of task and the underinformative condition is also significant, but not 




Table 2: Results of a glmer performed on the whole data 
 
4.3.2. SUBSETS OF THE DATA. We divide the subset analysis into three parts: scalar implicatures, 
control statements, and overly strong statements.  
For scalar implicatures, to determine rates of implicature with more precision, we looked at 
the corresponding stronger alternative statements with sigur ‘certainly’. Subjects were assumed to 
derive scalar implicatures when they gave a small apple reward to the underinformative statement 
with poate ‘maybe’ (2a, 4a) and a big apple reward to the stronger alternative statement with sigur 
‘certainly’. Interestingly, whereas in the Right-Wrong Task, only 29.24% speakers rejected 
underinformative sentences, with only 14 consistent speakers (i.e., giving more than 5 expected 
answers out of 8), in the Best Description Task, there were 66.67% scalar answers, with 41 
consistent subjects (see Figure 3). We ran a logistic regression using a logit mixed-effects model 
with Scalar implicatures as variable, Task type and Scenario as fixed effects and Item and 
Participant as random effects. The results reveal a significant effect for Task (β = −3.503, SE = 
1.664, Z = −5.274, p < 0.001) and the interaction between Task and Scenario (β = 0.393, SE = 
0.196, Z = 2.011, p = 0.044), but no significant effect per Scenario (β = −0.203, SE = 0.1435, Z = 
−1.417, p = 0.156). 
 
Figure 3: Scalar implicatures per task 
Parameter Estimate Std. 
error 
z p 
Intercept 2.794 0.227 12.293 < 2e-16 *** 
Task type right wrong -0.893 0.193 -4.634 3.58e-06 *** 
Condition Overly Strong -1.033 0.149 -6.931 4.17e-12 *** 
Condition Underinformative -1.423 0.14 -10.096 < 2e-16 *** 
Task type right wrong: Condition Overly Strong 0.097 0.182 0.536 0.592 
Task type right wrong: Condition Underinformative -0.913 0.178 -5.121 3.03e-07 
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The results for control sentences (see Table 3) reveal more accuracy in the Best Description 
Task than in the Right-Wrong Task, indicating that the Best description encourages participants’ 
attention. We conducted a logistic regression using a mixed-effects model with Task and Truth as 
fixed effects and random by-item and by-participant slopes. The results reveal a significant effect 
per Task (β = −1.164, SE = 0.199, Z = −5.841, p < 0.001), Truth (β = −0.904, SE = 0.105, Z = 
−8.56, p < 0.001), as well as the interaction between Task and truth (β = 0.265, SE = 0.129, Z = 
2.052, p = 0.004).  
Accuracy                                Best Task        Right-Wrong Task 
Optimal control sentences 






Table 3: Accuracy in control sentences per task 
 
Interestingly, in the case of overly strong statements, there was also more accuracy with the 
Best Description Task (35.67%) than with the Right-Wrong Task (22.17%), see Figure 6. A 
logistic regression using a mixed-effects model with Task as a fixed effect and Item and Participant 
as random effects reveals a significant task effect (β = −2.877, SE = 0.642, Z = −4.482, p < 0.001), 
while including random by-item and by-participant slopes leads to near significance per Task (β = 




Figure 6: Yes to overly strong sentences per task 
 
5. Discussion. The whole set analysis indicates that participants behave more accurately with 
underinformative statements in the Best Description Task.  However, we decided to also do subset 
analyses of the data, given that awarding the dragon with a small apple for underinformative 
statements is not necessarily an indication of scalar implicatures. To see this, note that there are at 
least two possible reasons for rejecting the underinformative sentence (4a), either (a) the 
participant thinks it is impossible for the silhouette to be the blue dog, in which case he/she would 
also reject the stronger alternative, or (b) the subject thinks it is actually certain, not just possible 
that it is the blue dog, in which case he/she would accept ‘It is certain that it is the blue dog’. Since 
we did not ask subjects why they gave certain answers-in order to keep the test relatively short, 
both options are possible in the current experimental set-up. Thus, we decided to analyze whether 
participants derive implicatures by looking at the underinformative sentences (in both scenarios) 
and at the corresponding stronger alternative statements with certain(ly). We noticed four different 
patterns of responses in our participants (see Table 4): a logical pattern, for subjects who accepted 
both optimal and underinformative statements, a pragmatic pattern, for subjects who rejected the 
underinformative statement, but accepted the optimal one, a cautious pattern, for subjects who 
accepted the underinformative statements, but not the optimal ones with sigur ‘certainly’, and an 
erroneous pattern, for subjects who rejected both the underinformative and optimal statements. 
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Table 4: Subjects’ patterns of response in underinformative and optimal true sentences 
 
Interestingly, there is no difference between the proportions of scalar implicatures derived with 
underinformative sentences belonging to the None in front Scenario or the Two in front Scenario. 
Evaluating whether the silhouette belongs to a certain animal class or is an animal of a certain 




Table 5: Subjects’ patterns of responses per task and scenario 
 
The results from our Right-Wrong Task with epistemic adverbs reveal quite low rates of 
implicatures (29.24%). In contrast, the Best Description Task leads to higher implicature rates 
(66.67%). On the one hand, it is unclear whether the low rates in the Right-Wrong Task could be 
explained through the more complex nature of the scalar items tested (epistemic adverbs), as well 
as language-specific facts related to Romanian (the fact that epistemic adverbs select full CPs, for 
instance). We would expect these factors to affect implicature-derivation in the Best Description 
Task as well, not just in the Right-Wrong Task. On the other hand, both the Best Description task 
and the Right-Wrong Task were implemented as a binary task, so the results cannot be understood 
in terms of an opposition between binary and ternary (as in Katsos & Bishop 2011). Rather, the 
essential aspect seems to be related to how task instructions model participants’ attention: the 
Right-Wrong Task encourages adults to pay attention to the truth value of the statements they hear, 
whereas the Best Description Task encourages adults to pay attention to informativity. 
As far as the control statements are concerned, the results again suggest better accuracy with 
the Best Description Task. Importantly, the fact that participants had lower accuracy on the true 
statements suggests there was no yes bias, but rather a tendency to place ‘bets’ on certain animals 
and reject statements about the possible presence of other animals behind the curtain. 
In the case of overly strong statements, both tasks had participants who rewarded dragons with 
big apples (using sigur ‘certainly’ where the weaker poate ‘maybe’ was optimal). The quite high 
number of big apple rewards for overly strong statements is unexpected given that such statements 
are false, not optimal. While this could be due to inattention, the higher accuracy in the control 
statements sheds doubt upon such an explanation. We believe that such answers actually reflect a 
tendency to place a ‘bet’ on one of the animals when it is yet unknown what animal lies behind 
the curtain, a tendency which is encouraged by the present task. The Best Description Task taps 
into subjects’ awareness that they should not place a bet on a certain outcome, hoping that it is 
true, but rather evaluate whether the statement they hear corresponds to the situation in the best 
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way possible or not. Thinking whether the baby dragon described the situation best makes it clearer 
that they are not dealing with a guessing game, but rather a reward game based on evidence. 
6. Conclusion. The results show a significant task effect in the derivation of scalar implicatures 
with poate ‘maybe’ when comparing the Truth Value Judgment (the Right-Wrong Task) to the 
Optimality Judgment (the Best Description Task). Interestingly, accuracy seems to be better in the 
Best Description Task even with control statements and overly strong statements, which suggests 
that asking adults to reward characters depending on whether their statement is the best description 
or not makes adults more attentive. In contrast, there may be more tolerance with respect to what 
they consider right and wrong. This is very much in line with the Katsos & Bishop (2011) language 
acquisition findings. Katsos & Bishop (2011) argue that the Right-Wrong Binary Task masks 
children’s sensitivity to underinformativeness due to their pragmatic tolerance. In other words, 
children tend to consider underinformative statements true, but they realize underinformative 
statements are not optimal. This becomes obvious in their ternary task, where children reward 
optimal, underinformative, and false statements differently. 
In the Right-Wrong Task, there were low rates of implicatures, whereas, in the Best 
Description Task, there were high implicature rates. This indicates that adults are sensitive to task 
instructions. Importantly, testing adults’ interpretation of the stronger alternatives to the 
underinformative statements allows us to make an informed decision about whether speakers 
derived scalar implicatures or not. In this way, we can evaluate not only adults’ sensitivity to 
underinformativeness in the Best Description Task, but their actual ability to derive implicatures.  
The current experiments thus show the importance of methodology in research: (even 
linguistically naïve) adults generate implicatures only when asked the adequate question. For these 
reasons, we recommend using test questions about optimality, especially considering previous 
research where inferences were not robust. Nevertheless, an important point is in order: deciding 
whether participants derive implicatures implies establishing whether they consider a certain 
statement true yet underinformative. While the Right-Wrong Task masks sensitivity to 
underinformativeness (since the statements rewarded with big apples are either optimal or 
underinformative), the Best Description Task, which was implemented as a binary task as well, 
masks adults’ truth evaluations (since the statements rewarded with small apples are either 
underinformative or false). Hence, it is extremely important to either ask questions about 
participants’ reasons for giving a certain answer or include control sentences that evaluate whether 
participants accepted the stronger alternatives (of underinformative statements)-the latter 
represents the strategy we adopted in our experiments. Another option is to resort to ternary tasks, 
which test participants’ understanding of optimal, underinformative, and false statements at once, 
through a three-valued reward system.  
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